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RECENT CASES
Torts - Prenatal Injuries
The case of Sinkler v. Kneale' is a recent example of the ex-
tended deviation from the outmoded rule laid down in the land-
mark decision of Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton.2
The Sinkler decision sustained the right of an infant to bring an
action for injuries received while she was one month en ventre sa
mere, said injuries alleged to have resulted in her being a Mongo-
loid. In reaching its decision the court was cognizant of three
potential barriers to allowing recovery for prenatal injuries: (1)
adequate proof of causal relationship is difficult, (2) the non-
viable state of the foetus further invites speculation and con-
jecture, and (3) the concept that the child in utero is "part of"
the mother and therefore unable to bring a cause of action.
To refute the cogent problem pertaining to proof of causa-
tion, the court placed upon the jury the ultimate responsibility
for evaluating medical testimony necessary to establish legal
causation and reasoned that the task was no greater in a pre-
natal injury than in certain other cases involving personal injury.
In response to the arguments for the non-entity of the foetus and
its lack of viability, the court said:
As for the notion that a child must have been viable
when the injuries were received, which has claimed the at-
tention of several of the states, we regard it as having little to
do with the basic right to recover, when the foetus is regarded
as having existence as a separate creature from the moment
of conception 3
Thus, the essence of the court's decision is premised upon the
theory that a foetus has an independent legal existence and this
existence arises from the moment of conception. In view of this,
1401 Pa. 267, 164 A. 2d 93 (1960).
2138 Mass. 14 (1884). In this leading case the infant was injured while four
or five months en ventre sa ,nare. The court, speaking through Judge Oliver
W. Holmes, Jr., denied recovery because there was not a "person! injured.
3Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A. 2d 93, 96 (1960).
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the question is raised concerning the propriety of the "viable"
test, which is the standard and majority criterion as applied to
actions based on prenatal injuries.4
At present, nineteen jurisdictions allow recovery for injuries
inflicted upon a child while en ventre sa me&e,5 but only four
courts have relied upon the doctrine that legal rights for tortious
injury arise in the foetus from the moment of conception. 6
An example of this minority rule is a recent decision from the
court of New Jersey.7 In over-ruling their 1942 decision in
Stemmer v. Kline,8 the court erected and then demolished some
ancient obstacles barring the way to recovery for a prenatal
injury. The lack of precedent no longer restrains a court, and
stare decisis is not an absolute and inflexible rule. Furthermore,
the diffsculty of proving a fact before a jury "is not a very good
reason for blocking all attempts to prove it."9 The court cited
4Annot: 10 A.L.R. 2d 1051.
5California-Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 626, 92 P. 2d 678 (1939);
Connecticut-Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 19 Conn. Sup. 487, 118 A.
2d 633 (1955); Delaware-Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrari, Inc., 50 Del. 258,
128 A. 2d 557 (1956); District of Columbia-Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.
Supp. 138 (1946); Georgia-Tucker v. Howard I. Carmichael & Sons, 208
Ga. 210, 65 S.E. 2d 909 (1951); Illinois-Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill. 422,
114 N.E. 2d 412 (1953); Kentucky-Mitchell v. Couch, Ky. Ct. App. 1955
285 S.W. 2d 902 (1955); Louisiana-Cooper v. Blanck, La. App. 1923,
39 So. 2d 352 (1923); Maryland-Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 197 Md. 417,
79 A. 2d 550 (1951); Massachusetts-Keyes v. Construction Service, Inc.,
.Mass .........., 165 N E. 2d 912 (1960); Minnesota-Verkennes v. Cor-
niea, 229 Miss. 365, 38 N.W. 2d 838 (1949); Mississippi-Rainey v.
Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Missouri-Steggall v. Morris,
363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W. 2d 577 (1953); New Hampshire-Poliquin v.
MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A. 2d 249 (1957); New Jersey-Smith v.
Brennan & Galbraiths, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A. 2d 497 (1960); New York-
Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E. 2d 691 (1951); Ohio-Williams
v. Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. 2d 334 (1949);
Oregon-Mallison v. Pomeroy, 205 Or. 690, 291 P. 2d 225 (1955); South
Carolina-Hall v. Murphy, S.C. 1960, 113 S.E. 2d 790 (1960).
6Georgia-Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co., 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E. 2d
727 (1956); New Hampshire-Bennett v. Hymers, 101 N.H. 483, 147 A.
2d 108 (1958); New Jersey-Smith v. Brennan & Galbraiths, 31 N.J. 353,
157 A. 2d 497 (1960); New York-Kelly v. Gregory, 282 App. Div. 542,
125 N.Y.S. 2d 696 (1953).
7Smith v. Brennan & Galbraiths, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A. 2d 497 (1960).
8128 N.J.L. 455, 26 A. 2d 489 (1942).
9Smith v. Brennan & Galbraiths, supra 157 A. 2d at 503.
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leading medical authorities which supported their views 0 and
adopted the doctrine which gives a legal right of action from the
moment of conception.
In the majority of those jurisdictions permitting recovery for
a personal injury, the applicable test is that of the viability of the
foetus at the time of the injury." "Capable of independent life"
is the wording of the South Carolina court.12 The Illinois court
limits recovery to those cases in which the infant is "viable and
capable of separate and independent existence.' 3
The decisions of those jurisdictions which do not permit
recovery for prenatal injuries14 afford some basis to properly
evaluate the relative merits of the doctrines of 'viable foetus' and
'moment of conception.' Alabama voiced a fear of speculation
and a general lack of precedent in a 1926 opinion of that court.
The Tennessee court, in rejecting the views of certain medical
authorities, held that a child in utero was not a 'person' within
the meaning of their Death by Wrongful Act Statute: "In truth
and in fact, it (the foetus) is part of its own mother's physical
body." 6 The court tacitly welcomed legislative action to alter this
interpretation of the statute. In Rhode Island the court denied
recovery for a prenatal injury, stating that "This imputed exist-
ence in esse to an unborn child is a fiction of the civil law.., for
purposes connected with the acquisition and preservation of real
,od, at 502.
l1See supra note 5, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon and
South Carolina.
12Hall v. Murphy, S.C. 1960, 113 S.E. 2d 790, 791 (1960).
iSAman v. Faidy, 415 Ml1. 422, 114 N.E. 2d 412, 417 (1953).
14Alahama-Standford v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., 214 Ala. 611, 108
So. 566 (1926); Michigan-LaBlue v. Specker, 358 Mich. 558, 100 N.W.
2d 445 (1960); Nebraska-Brabbels v. Skelly Oil Co., 155 Neb. 17, 50
N.W. 2d 229 (1951); Oklahoma-Howell v. Rushing, Okl. Sup. Ct.,
1953, 261 P. 2d 217 (1953); Rhode Island-Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I.
169, 49 A. 704 (1901); Tennessee-Hogan v. McDaniel, Tenn. Sup. Ct.
1958, 319 S.W. 2d 221 (1958); Texas-Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W. 2d 944 (1935); Wisconsin-Pui v.
Milwaukee Auto Ins. Co., 8 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W. 2d 163 (1960).
15Standford v. St. Louis-San Francisco RI. Co., supra note 14.
16Hogan v. McDaniel, supra note 14 at 224.
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and personal property"17 and therefore was not applicable to an
action in tort.
Thus, the difficulty of proving a causal connection and some
antiquated concepts of obstetrics seem to be the only real barriers
against recovery for a prenatal injury. However, the courts are
recognizing the advances of modern medical science which ac-
knowledge the separate character of the foetus in utero; therefore,
it would seem that the sole remaining objection is the difficulty
of proving a cause of action brought by the injured infant.
Certain justifiable anxieties expressed by those conservative
tribunals which have refused relief to the infant injured while
en ventre sa mare should not be ignored and primary among
these is the extreme difficulty of proof. The Wisconsin court
recognized this in the pertinent case of Puhl v. Miluaukee Auto
Ins. Co.18 On all fours with the principal case of Sinkler, the suit
involved the right to bring an action where the injury in utero
purportedly resulted in the birth of a Mongoloid. Assuming that
the right of recovery arose from the moment of conception, the
appellate court rejected the finding of the jury in favor of the
infant-plaintiff upon the grounds that "there was not sufficient
credible proof to sustain an award."' 9 The court acknowledged
the progress of medical research but properly applied the cautious
machinery of the law to act as a scale upon which the rules of
evidence must be carefully balanced against rapid, and yet
theoretical advances of science. After considering the conflicting
statements of various doctors who testified to the causal connec-
tion between the injury and its possible influence upon the infant,
the court concluded:
While this court has gone a long way in admitting expert
testimony deduced from well-recognized scientific and medical
principles or discoveries, nevertheless the facts from which the
opinion is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular medical field in which
they belong. Otherwise, the opinion is based not on facts
but conjecture.20
17Gorman v. Budlong, supra note 14 at 705.
188 Wis. 2d 343, 99 N.W. 2d 163 (1960).
191d. at 169.
20Ibid.
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Here, an alert court placed close scrutiny upon evidence pre-
sented to establish a causal connection in a case involving pre-
natal injury. Such scrutiny by an appellate court greatly reduces
the inherent threat of speculative evaluation by a jury and the
proof of the cause of action takes on a desired stability.
Medical science is satisfied that a child en ventre sa mere is
not a "part of" its mother, but is a separate and individual crea-
ture. Furthermore, this separate character arises from the time of
conception. Although the test of 'viability' has a basic quality
of reducing speculation and conjecture in prenatal injury cases,
it must be admitted that it does not afford an adequate remedy
for an injured infant. The fundamental problem is one of proof.
It is submitted that the 'moment of conception' doctrine does
offer substantial legal relief to an infant injured in utero and
accords with modem concepts within the science of medicine.
However, a conservative and penetrating eye should carefully
maintain a constant surveillance to prevent unmerited or sham
claims from passing through the courts.
S. T. M.
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